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MICROSOFT'S INTERNET EXPLORATION:
PREDATORY OR COMPETITIVE?
Thomas W. Hazlettt
In May 1998 the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") accused
Microsoft of violatirig the Sherman Antitrust Act by vigorously compet-
ing against Netscape's Navigator software with Microsoft's rival
browser, Internet Explorer. The substance of the allegation revolves
around defensive actions taken by Microsoft to protect the dominant po-
sition enjoyed by Microsoft's Windows operating system. The DOJ's
theory is that, were it not for Microsoft's overly aggressive reaction to
Netscape, Navigator software would have been more broadly distributed,
thus enabling competition to Windows. This competition would have
come directly from Java, a computer language developed by Sun
Microsystems and embedded in Netscape software, allowing applications
to run on any underlying operating system. Fearing the spread of Java
would render a Windows monopoly moot, the DOJ argues, Microsoft
engaged in predatory behavior to pre-empt Netscape and, therefore, Java.
This set of allegations can most usefully be analyzed under a four-part
test for predation examining opportunity, intent, conduct, and effect. The
analysis hereunder shows that while Microsoft's aggressive actions have
likely injured specific competitors, the "browser jihad" featured as Ex-
hibit A in the DOJ's antitrust case is a dramatic illustration of the pro-
consumer consequences of robust market rivalry.
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE: PREDATION
"To protect its valuable Windows monopoly against such potential
competitive threats [from Netscape and other new software products],
and to extend its operating system monopoly into other software markets,
Microsoft has engaged in a series of anticompetitive activities."'1
t Professor of Agricultural & Resource Economics, and Director of the Program on
Telecommunications Policy, University of California, Davis; Resident Scholar, American En-
terprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. Ph.D., (Economics), UCLA,
1984. Author's email: thazlett@aei.org.
This paper is part of a larger research project on Antitrust in the Age of Microsoft being
conducted jointly with Professor George Bittlingmayer of U.C. Davis. No project funding or
consulting work by either researcheris associated with the parties involved in United States v.
Microsoft, although Prof. Hazlett has previously served as an expert witness for the U.S. De-
partment of Justice.
1 Complaint at para. 5, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No.
98-1232).
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In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the U.S. Department of Justice
argues Microsoft's dominance in operating systems-over eighty percent
of Intel-based personal computers ("PCs") in the U.S. run on Microsoft
Windows software 2-was threatened by the emergence of Netscape's
Navigator, a popular software application for surfing the World Wide
Web. Navigator is designed to run on various operating systems, and
includes Java programming language enabling other applications to run
irrespective of the underlying operating system. The Java language's op-
erating system indifference posed a threat to the dominance of Microsoft
Windows, which rested largely on the ability of Windows users to access
thousands of compatible applications. Were Netscape browsers to be-
come ubiquitous, PC users could run applications in Java and not much
care whether their Netscape software sat on top of Windows, Mac OS,
Unix, OS/2, Solaris, Linux or another operating system.
The DOJ's case reduces to the charge of predation. While the com-
plaint includes much language about "leveraging" and "tie-ins," where
Microsoft is accused of using its operating system market power to in-
vade and dominate ancillary markets (most importantly, the browser
market), and a brief section alleging Microsoft generally suppresses in-
novation in software, these allegations do not add up to a coherent theory
of anti-competitive behavior. The monopoly-extension allegation, i.e.,
leveraging Windows' market position to eliminate Netscape's Navigator
browser in favor of Microsoft's browser, Internet Explorer, is a vertical
allegation. Such cases have been discredited in instances where the cus-
tomer is known to use both the monopolized good and the ancillary good
in fixed proportions. 3 That is, the monopolist over Product A has no
anti-competitive interest in expanding to take over the market for Product
B, where buyers of a unit of A (say, a PC operating system) also demand
a unit of B (say, a web browser).
Simply put, all monopoly profits can be extracted by setting the
price of A. (The producer of A may choose to integrate into the produc-
tion of B if it can offer a lower price, either through lower cost produc-
tion or by eliminating a monopoly price mark-up. Lower prices for the
complementary good B raise demand for A, increasing sales and profits.
Of course, such actions are efficient and benefit consumers). Since oper-
ating system users are typically willing to pay in excess of marginal cost
(which is zero) for a web browser, the fixed-proportions assumption is
reasonable, and the vertical foreclosure argument moot. As for the alle-
gation that Microsoft's aggressive behavior-in the "browser wars" has
retarded entry into software and internet-related markets, the financial
2 See id. at para. 2.
3 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
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tidal wave pushing massive investment into internet and computer
software markets has obliterated that aspect of the case.4
Both supporters and opponents of the government's case agree its
essence is the allegation of predatory conduct. Robert H. Bork, a former
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge and consultant to Netscape, offered
this conclusion when the complaint was filed:
The case against Microsoft is not an attack on vertical
integration; that is not the objection to the coupling of
Microsoft's browser, the Internet Explorer .... [T]he
Microsoft case concerns a monopolist's horizontal at-
tempt to preserve its monopoly by destroying a potential
rival.5
An August 1999 paper by economist David S. Evans-of National
Economic Research Associates, the economic consulting firm retained
by Microsoft to assist with the antitrust litigation-comes to the same
conclusion.6 While noting the original complaint did not contain the
words "predation" or "predatory," the actual case pursued by the DOJ
turned out to be "all about predation."' 7 Evans concludes the rest of the
allegations amount to a sideshow: "[T]he tying and foreclosure claims
make only token appearances in the Government's Proposed Findings of
Fact."8
I. THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF PREDATION
Predation, which encompasses predatory pricing and other anti-
competitive actions such as foreclosure, is distinguished from "honestly
industrial" economic behavior by its net effect on consumers. In compet-
itive situations, firms take actions which injure other firms, such as low-
4 The Complaint read:
Microsoft's conduct adversely affects innovation, including by: (a) impairing the
incentive of Microsoft's competitors and potential competitors to undertake research
and development, because they know that Microsoft will be able to limit the rewards
from any resulting innovation; (b) impairing the ability of Microsoft's competitors
and potential competitors to obtain financing for research and development.
Complaint at para. 37, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No. 98-
1232). In the years following the initial public offering of Netscape (August 1995), a spectac-
ular shift occurred in the financial markets, with venture capitalists showering money on
"dot.com" start-ups and Wall Street investors clamoring to bid on stock issued in Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) of interet-related businesses. See discussion infra Parts III.D, IV.
5 Robert H. Bork, White Paper, ZDNN (July 29, 1998) <http://www.zdnet.comi/zdnn/
stories/news/0,4586,2123665,00.htm>.
6 David S. Evans, Antitrust on Internet Time: Whatever Happened to the Government's
Case in United States v. Microsoft? (September 17, 1999) <http://www.microsoft.com/press-
pass/ofnote/nera/09-17nera.htm>.
7 Id. at I.B.5.
8 Id. at I.A.
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ering prices, introducing innovative products, or aggressively advertising
the advantages of their products, by enticing customers to switch to pre-
ferred alternatives. There exists a hann to competitors in such markets,
but not to competition. Indeed, the competitive process is adjudged to be
working well where consumers' options improve and inefficient firms
wither, perhaps exiting the market altogether.
Predatory actions diverge from competitive performance because,
even while short-term benefits to consumers may be tangible, ultimately
predation leads to higher prices and-on net-consumers lose. The stan-
dard episode involves predatory pricing. Assume a monopolist, M, sup-
plies a market with a single product and charges monopoly prices PM,
prices in excess of average or marginal cost MC, which for convenience
we take to be equal.9 Assume an equally efficient entrant E begins to
compete with M. Suppose M responds to the competition by slashing the
output price to a very low level PP, below even marginal cost (PP <
MC). Suppose further that such losses motivate the new competitor to
abandon the market entirely, perhaps due to bankruptcy. 10
Now the monopolist may be in position to raise prices back to PM,
realizing a stream of monopoly profits (PM - MC) for some period in the
future. Provided this monopoly market position is secure (i.e., entry bar-
riers block new competitors), the predator M will then recoup the losses
expended in the predatory rivalry. Hence, predation is an investment
sunk by an incumbent firm in anticipation of future returns. The differ-
ence between an ordinary, pro-competitive investment is that the returns
to predation flow from higher prices to consumers, wheras standard in-
vestments improve customer options via lower prices and/or greater
product quality.
9 This implies constant returns to scale. It also conveniently allows us to assume that
the perfectly competitive price (CP) would be equal to both average and marginal cost (CP =
MC).
10 It is important to the predation story that the firm's productive assets actually be elimi-
nated from the competitive market. If a firm simply goes bankrupt, the liquidated assets may
be redeployed by a successor firm, thus constraining the next move by the predator. Assets
may be rendered non-competitive by the predator firm buying them in a merger or a bank-
ruptey liquidation.
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FIGURE 1
A STYLIZED EPISODE OF PREDATORY PRICING
Phase I: Phase II:
Ultra-competition Recoupment
intense rivalry Key rival(s) monopoly prices
Exits high profits
very low prices entry barriers block new entry
producers absorb operating predatory investment
losses (losses in 1)
yield of supra-competitive
return
Experts in law and economics generally agree predatory conduct is
theoretically possible, but a skepticism reigns over whether predatory
practices are commonly employed. Indeed, an ongoing debate involves
whether courts have ever successfully identified predation.1 Interest-
ingly, a case Robert Bork singled out in his classic antitrust text12 as the
sole example of a U.S. Supreme Court foreclosure case, Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States,13 has recently been convincingly demolished as a
bona fide case of predation. 14 In the most recent predation case to come
before the Supreme Court, the Court noted predatory pricing is "rarely
tried, and even more rarely successful."'15 The degree of difficulty in
accurately pinpointing and remedying predation is high, because actions
which are plainly favorable to consumers-e.g., lowering prices-must
be distinguished from tactics that ultimately hurt consumers. Moreover,
the execution of predation takes place over time, and the inevitable
changes in underlying market dynamics make comparison of effects on
consumers problematic. Hence, both in identifying and in fixing preda-
tion, regulators aim at a difficult-and moving-target.
The analysis becomes more difficult still when the long-run losses
are anticipated, not observed (as in the Microsoft case, where Netscape/
Java has not been driven from the market and competition proceeds
apace). Importantly, the attempt to predate typically carries benefits
11 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MicH. L. Rav. 1696, 1701
(1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. Ray.
263, 305-07 (1981); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 289, 289-
92 (1980). See also James C. Miller, III & Paul Butler, Predation: The Changing View in
Economics and the Law, 28 J.L. & ECON. 495 (1985).
12 See BORK, supra note 3, at 344-46.
13 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
14 John E. Lopatka & Andrew N. Kleit, The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest for
Foreclosure in Antitrust, 73 Tax. L. REv. 1255, 1305 (1995).
15 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)).
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which, were they to last, would clearly make consumers better off.16
Hence, courts and regulators should refrain from too hastily "protecting"
consumers. In general, actions to constrain competition-the gist of a
legal action prosecuting allegedly predatory behavior-carry with them
the danger of suppressing unambiguously pro-consumer market forces.
Hence, a delicate line.
III. A FOUR-PART TEST FOR PREDATION
How should we evaluate the predatory conduct case against
Microsoft? I propose to use a four-part evaluation of predatory allega-
tions based upon the following elements: Opportunity, Intent, Conduct,
and Effect. Each of the elements is necessary for the presence of preda-
tion. Opportunity involves an appraisal of market power and long-run
entry barriers; unless a firm has a reasonable expectation of charging
monopoly prices for a lengthy time beyond the initial, ultra-competitive
phase of competition, then it is not profitable to pursue such a strategy.
Regulators would be well advised to let the spontaneous forces of the
market, and disgruntled shareholders, police corporate managers where
"recoupment" is unlikely to be realized.
Intent refers to the strategic designs of the alleged predator. A com-
pany may be left in a more profitable position due to the exit of firms
without predatorily causing the elimination of rivals. For instance, poor
business decisions or natural disasters may eliminate rivals. On the other
hand, firms may intend to eliminate rivals by providing superior products
at lower prices. This strategic mission is, by itself, pro-competitive; it
only becomes predatory when price increases ultimately harm consum-
ers. The best evidence of intent reveals conduct causally linking the (pro-
consumer) short-run effects of the predatory competition to the long-term
(anti-consumer) consequences resulting from price increases.
Conduct is what the company actually does to compete too vigor-
ously. The key is to distinguish aggressive rivalry, which routinely
targets rivals for harm, from behavior which is ultimately anti-consumer.
The classic example is pricing below marginal cost: despite the fact that
low prices are good for customers, why would a firm intentionally lose
money on units if not to drive rivals out of business and then raise
prices? 17 It turns out a pro-efficiency rationale for such behavior exists;
indeed, virtually every retailer distributes some products "below cost" as
a marketing tool, helping to bring product information to new customers.
16 This is the thrust of William J. Baumol's useful article on predatory pricing. See Wil-
liam J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory
Pricing, 89 YALE L.J 1 (1979).
17 See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. Rv. 697 (1975).
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But where there are no plausible, efficiency-enhancing explanations for
such behavior, predatory conduct becomes a leading candidate. An ex-
treme example would involve burning down a competitor's facility.
There are no efficiency justifications (output is unambiguously reduced),
and the gain to the surviving firm is more than offset by losses to con-
sumers in the form of higher prices and unrealized gains from trade.
The Effect of the allegedly predatory episode is most important. Are
customers injured? Do they pay higher prices or enjoy lower-quality
products? Negative effects registered on market competitors are relevant
only insofar as they can be tied to higher prices. Without evidence of
tangible losses suffered by buyers, the risk is that legal attacks on alleged
predatory conduct will turn into intra-industry squabbles, and regulators
will confuse the protection of competition with the protection of compet-
itors. In fact, competition is very hostile to competitors, and a robust
marketplace will by definition feature disgruntled firms, frustrated for-
mer competitors, and opportunistic litigants.
I now present an analysis of the May 1998 complaint filed in United
States v. Microsoft Corp. under this four-part test for predation.
A. OPPORTUNITY
Is it possible that Microsoft, after investing in a "jihad" to deter
Netscape/Java, would be left in a position to recoup losses from its re-
sulting (retained) monopoly position? The government argues Microsoft
thought it possible and even likely, as Microsoft's operating system is a
monopoly protected by substantial barriers to entry: "PC manufactur-
ers ... have no commercially reasonable alternative to Microsoft operat-
ing systems for the PCs they distribute."' s The DOJ's complaint only
superficially discusses the crucial issues regarding how long this position
will be maintained and what Microsoft would have to do to maintain it.
These omissions are critical to the government's case.
The DOJ argues competition from Netscape/Java is being nipped in
the bud to protect Microsoft's future monopoly profits in the PC operat-
ing system software market. 9 Among the actions taken, and cited by the
DOJ as specific examples of anti-competitive behavior, are Microsoft's
free distribution of its Internet Explorer browser both on the Net (as a
stand-alone upgrade for Windows machines) and bundled within Win-
dows 95 and Windows 98.20 For instance, the complaint notes: "But Mr.
Gates did not stop at free distribution [of Internet Explorer]."'21
18 Complaint at para. 2, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No.
98-1232).
19 See id. at para. 6-8.
20 See idL at para. 13-19.
21 See ia& at para. 17.
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Microsoft assertedly plans to enjoy additional monopoly profits in the
future by giving away software it could charge for today. 22
While Microsoft's large market share and extreme profitability
seem to lend credence to the government's position, the existence of
long-run entry barriers to competing with the Windows operating system
is belied by the DOJ's own argument. For the monopoly "solution" prof-
fered in the complaint-Java embedded in Netscape Navigator-itself
became a viable threat to Microsoft by accessing personal computers us-
ing Windows. That success was unrivaled by any software application in
history-some thirty-eight million users of Netscape in just eighteen
months.23 Indeed, Netscape's ability to successfully interface with the
software of its arch-rival was a key to its success, as even Netscape's
former CEO, James Barksdale, has conceded:
I don't want anybody saying we're against Microsoft,
we don't appreciate what they've done. They created
companies like ours. If they didn't have that operating
system with their set of plug-ins and their set of plat-
forms, our business wouldn't be here.24
Indeed, the very nature of Microsoft's operating system business is
to make computers run applications. As innovative applications are de-
veloped by non-Microsoft vendors, demand for Microsoft operating sys-
tem software increases. Moreover, any incompatibility with Microsoft
Windows reduces what the Department of Justice cites as Microsoft's
most important barrier to entry: the wide availability of useful applica-
tions software. Hence, it is not surprising Microsoft has sought to en-
courage widespread access to Windows by independent software
developers. Its policies in this respect are most fruitfully compared, not
to some ideal, theoretical construct but to its most long-lived direct com-
petitor, Mac OS. Apple actually pursued a strategy similar to the one the
government alleges in the Microsoft case, when, in the early to mid-
1980s, it attempted to exploit its early lead in technology and high mar-
ket share. 5 It pursued a "premium price" strategy to realize high profit
margins, and closed its system to many outside developers including
computer hardware makers. Despite pleas from both internal and exter-
22 Microsoft has pledged that Internet Explorer will be forever free, but of course the
price of Windows-with which Internet Explorer is bundled-may rise. At trial, the DOJ's
economic expert speculated that Microsoft would in fact substantially raise operating system
software fees in the future.
23 See MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON IN-
TERNET TIME: LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH MICROSOFT 10
(1998).
24 PAUL ANDREWS, HOW THE WEB WAS WON 290 (1999).
25 See JIM CARLTON, APPLE: THE INSIDE STORY OF INTRIGUE, EGOMANIA,
AND BUSINESS BLUNDERS 38-61 (1997).
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nal parties (including, most ironically, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates) to lib-
erally license its advanced graphical user interface so as to become an
industry standard, it settled on a low-volume, high-margin business plan
that ultimately proved disastrous for company shareholders.
Microsoft adopted a radically different vision, aggressively partner-
ing with computer makers and using low-price strategies to achieve high
market share. As this policy has developed, it has become clear
Microsoft can do relatively little to seal itself off from threats to its oper-
ating system dominance; its pursuit of market share forces it to include a
very wide range of compatible applications and complements. Its prior-
ity of MS-DOS/Windows ubiquity mandated it "create companies like"
Mr. Barksdale's. Moreover, with web functionality so deeply integrated
in Windows, this vulnerability of operating system market share becomes
permanently tenuous. As Windows users feed the growth of the Net, the
growth of the Net in turn allows competitive applications and operating
systems-or programs (like Java) which perform the functions of operat-
ing systems-to gain access to vast numbers of computer users. The
evolution of web-based computing, bringing Net-wide availability of ap-
plications, has spontaneously drawn PC operating systems into a larger,
more competitive environment. While the government looks at
Microsoft's market share in operating system software as high and safely
secured, the underlying reality is Microsoft finds itself severely con-
strained in determining both the price of Windows and the functionality
it offers.
A standard way economists gauge market power is to examine
where a firm sets its prices in relation to its costs. In evidence gleaned
from trial testimony and elsewhere, it is safe to assume the average price
charged for Windows 95 or 98 during the alleged period of predation
(approximately 1995-present) is about fifty dollars. 26 During this
timeframe, the typical PC cost about $1500. The mark-up by Microsoft
for its PC operating system is, therefore, in the neighborhood of three to
four percent. Noting the PC itself is useless without an operating system,
and recalling the DOJ's claim that there is no reasonable substitute for
Windows in the PC operating system market, the question must be asked:
Why does Microsoft price Windows so low?
If, in fact, Microsoft were safely able to predict continued domi-
nance of the PC operating system it would demonstrably price Windows
much higher so as to maximize profits. Economists evaluate such pric-
ing decisions in terms of elasticity of demand, and can formally relate the
price/marginal cost margin to elasticity of demand for the firm by use of
26 This is the wholesale price to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) where the
great bulk of sales take place. Few consumers buy PCs without operating system software pre-
loaded.
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the Lerner Index.27 In this case, the elasticity faced by Microsoft is
about negative thirty, a level which would easily categorize the firm de-
mand curve as constrained by highly competitive substitutes. 28
Microsoft does enjoy very high market share, selling much more PC
operating system software than its direct competitors. But the unan-
swered question in the DOJ complaint is: Why? The answer is straight-
forward: at a higher price, Microsoft expects it would soon invite
competition, lose sales, and realize lower profits. This is powerful mar-
ket evidence that the safely protected long-run monopoly profits scenario
implicit in the government's predation case is a chimera. When setting
prices to maximize company value (i.e., the discounted present value of
profits), Microsoft demonstrates it does not operate on market power as-
sumptions nearly so generous as touted by the government. The govern-
ment, which emphasizes the credibility of its case by basing it so heavily
on the statements of Microsoft executives themselves, ought to give at
least equal weight to the actions of Microsoft in pricing its product.
Given that the opportunity to extract monopoly mark-ups in operating
system software is rejected by Microsoft, the government's case that
Microsoft predates to maintain monopoly pricing in the future is severly
compromised.
B. ITrENT
The DOJ complaint dwells on the issue of intent. Indeed, the case
constructed relies heavily on three strategic goals purportedly pursued by
Microsoft: (1) a "browser war" against Netscape; 29 (2) "leveraging" the
Windows monopoly to advance (1)30; and, thereby, (3) eliminating
27 The Lerner Index, the standard rule for analyzing market power from observed pricing
markups, is defined as: P = MCI[1 + (1/E)], where P = output price, MC = marginal cost, and
e = firm's elasticity of demand. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS, 347-48 (4,h ed. 1998).
28 See id.
Given an estimate of the firm's elasticity of demand, the manager can calculate the
proper markup. If the firm's elasticity of demand is large, this markup will be small
(and we can say that the firm has very little monopoly power). If the firm's elasticity
of demand is small, this markup will be large (and the firm will have considerable
monopoly power).
ld. at 349-50. (Note that, while demand elasticities are always negative, as price and quantity
demanded vary inversely, the authors are speaking in absolute value terms; "large" elasticities
correspond to larger negative numerical estimates.) The textbook goes on to give estimates of
firm demand elasticities in different markets, the most competitive example being the retail
food business (supermarkets). There firm elasticities are "often as large as -10," and therefore
"a typical supermarket should set prices about 11 percent above marginal cost." Id.
29 The DOJ cites an internal Microsoft document which refers to the Netscape-Microsoft
competition in browserware as a "browser war" and a "jihad." Complaint at para. 10, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No. 98-1232).
30 The Complaint, citing Microsoft executive James Allchin's memo of January 2, 1997,
alleged:
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"competition on the merits" between Internet Explorer and Netscape
Navigator.31 The evidence for these charges consists largely of public
statements, internal memos, and email messages by Microsoft execu-
tives. As the New York Times reported the government's closing argu-
ments, "Government lawyers say their strongest hand is the copious
documentary evidence they subpoenaed from Microsoft: thousands of E-
mail messages and other internal corporate records from the last five
years."32
What constitutes a smoking gun? Intent is a little tricky, since a
corporation is a complex entity and a large number of executives may be
writing many things for various purposes, not all of which will deter-
mine, reflect, or even influence strategic corporate policy. Even the
statements of high company executives caught in the act of setting corpo-
rate policy must be interpreted with care. Start with the classic death
threat; the DOJ complaint repeatedly stresses statements by Microsoft
employees about planning to wage a "war" or "jihad" against Netscape,
cutting off the company's "air supply. ' 33 Yet the act of "attempted mur-
der," let alone mere threats of bodily harm, does not constitute an eco-
nomic crime. All market rivalry is reducible to an attempt to steal
Microsoft needed to begin "leveraging Windows from a marketing perspective" if it
was to defeat Netscape. Allchin complained that without leveraging Windows from
a marketing standpoint: "We do not use our strength which is that we have an in-
stalled base of Windows and we have a strong OEM shipment channel for Win-
dows." Allchin emphasized: "I am convinced we have to use Windows[.] mhis is
the one thing they don't have .... We have to be competitive with features, but we
need something more [-] Windows integration. If you agree that Windows is a
huge asset, then it follows quickly that we are not investing sufficiently in finding
ways to tie 1E and Windows together." Using Microsoft's code name, Memphis, for
the next version of Windows, Allchin concluded that, "Memphis must be a simple
upgrade, but most importantly it must be a killer on OEM shipments so that Net-
scape never gets a chance on these systems." (MS7 005526).
Id. at para. 114(c).
31 The Complaint repeatedly refers to Microsoft's intent to subvert "competition on the
merits." Il at para. 36. For instance:
[Tihe Complaint challenges only Microsoft's concerted attempts to maintain its mo-
nopoly in operating systems and to achieve dominance in other markets, not by inno-
vation and other competition on the merits, but by tie-ins, exclusive dealing
contracts, and other anticompetitive agreements that deter innovation, exclude com-
petition, and rob customers of their right to choose among competing alternatives.
Id.
32 Joel Brinkley, Last Arguments Are Offered in Microsoft Case, N.Y. TnAms, Sept. 22,
1999, at Cl.
33 Id. at para. 10. The Complaint stated: "To respond to the competitive threat posed by
Netscape's browser, Microsoft embarked on an extensive campaign to market and distribute
Microsoft's own Internet browser, which it named 'Intenet Explorer' or 'IE.' Microsoft exec-
utives have described this campaign as a 'jihad' to win the 'browser war."' Id. The DOJ also
cited Microsoft's Paul Maritz, Microsoft's Group Vice President, Platforms Group: "We are
going to cut off their air supply. Everything they're selling, we're going to give away for
free." Id. at para. 16.
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market share from competitors, starve rivals, and induce exit. Purely by
itself, the threat is evidence of competitive intent, and can be used to help
establish the absence of cartelistic behavior outlawed by § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.34 At an operational level, targeting visible, successful rivals
for extinction is often an excellent way to focus company personnel and
strategy; gauging company progress by the amount of market share "sto-
len" from competitors is an efficient means by which to track market
success.
Microsoft has obligingly served as a target for the death threats of
its rivals in opposing campaigns which-despite the implausibility of
predatory intent-mirror the browser "jihad" launched by Microsoft.
For instance, America Online, in 1994 (as now) the leading provider of
online services and intemet access in the United States with several mil-
lion subscribers, braced itself for the launch of Microsoft Network (now
called MSN, then code named "Marvel") by having AOL vice-president
Ted Leonsis rally the troops in the following manner:
AOL would electrify its defenses to keep from becoming
the lunch of the T-Rex from the Pacific Northwest.
Microsoft was now the official enemy.
Why? "Marvel is designed as an 'AOL Killer,"' warned
Leonsis. "And the presumption of victory is to
Microsoft." Microsoft wanted to drive AOL out of busi-
ness, take jobs from AOL employees, and food from
their children's plates. It was big ... and easy to hate.
The number one priority was to create a warlike atmos-
phere against Microsoft, while girding AOL in the
process. 35
•1 . *
"Someday," declared Ted Leonsis to the hundreds of
AOL employees gathered at the Sheraton Premiere bal-
lroom in Tysons Comer, Virginia, on November 11,
1994, "your children will ask you what you did in the
war.")
3 6
With the crowd now cheering and whooping, bright
lights spinning and the music of Irish rock band U2
blasting over the speakers, Leonsis wheeled out a huge
wooden cutout of a dinosaur. "Come sign it," urged Le-
onsis. "Make your pledge that you will help destroy the
34 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
35 KARA SWISHER, AOL.COM 107 (1998).
36 Id. at 106.
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beast." Hundreds of AOL employees converged on the
stage, pens in hand. "Death to Marvel," one scrawled. 37
Interestingly, while Netscape began its existence mindful of the
shadow cast by the giant of the PC software market, it first set its sights
elsewhere. Its initial mission, after being formed in the spring of 1994,
was to seize the momentum in browser software from the market leader,
NCSA Mosaic. 38 This organization distributed, at no charge, over the
Internet, a popular web browser developed by the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois. Jim Clark, the
former Stanford University professor who founded Silicon Graphics
before creating Netscape, raided NCSA's former and current employees
(including the colorful twenty-three-year old code wizard, Marc An-
dreessen) to create a new firm initially called Mosaic Communications.
He immediately took dead aim at the market leader:
Clark and Andreessen had a clear idea of how they
wanted to develop their business. First, trounce the im-
mediate enemy, NCSA Mosaic. Next, keep an eye on
Microsoft, and if it came after them, force the giant com-
pany to fight on the unfamiliar turf of the Internet, turf
that Mosaic Communications would define and control.
But first things first. NCSA Mosaic must die. The Cas-
tro Street company [Mosaic Communications] would
win by building a better browser - and faster, before
people got too comfortable with the NCSA model.39
The motive driving Netscape to "build a better browser" was, of
course, the lure of profits. But the fledgling firm knew well the path to
competitive success in software would not be smooth. A big splash
quickly establishing a product as the favorite to establish a market stan-
dard would seize a decisive advantage over rivals. Firms who promoted
their product cautiously, carefully extracting maximum revenues, would
be vulnerable to more aggressive competitors due to network effects.
Once customers become familiar with, and gain human capital comple-
mentary with, a given software product, some degree of "lock-in" occurs.
And, as more customers use the standard, there is positive feedback; it
becomes a safer bet for customers to invest in complementary human
capital. Hence, an upward spiral in market penetration, as the industry
37 Id. at 108.
38 See JOSHUA QUITITNER & MICHELLE SLATALLA, SPEEDING THE NET: THE
INSIDE STORY OF NETSCAPE AND HOW iT CHALLENGED MICROSOFT 108-09
(1998).
39 Id. (emphasis in original).
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tips in favor of a popular technology efficiently exploiting economies of
scale.4o
Monopoly solutions are not foreordained, as multiple standards can
co-exist over time. But, where products are close substitutes and net-
work effects are strong, there is a slippery-slope where aggressive mar-
keting efforts may tumultuously alter the positions of rivals. This sort of
landscape leads firms to employ bold strategies for market dominance,
aiming at the destruction of a competitor through saturation sales cam-
paigns to amass market share, signaling customers that the superior prod-
uct is likely to be the one whose virtual network is growing rapidly
relative to rivals.41 The mass distribution of Netscape's browser free
over the Internet, starting in late-1994, was one such notable campaign, a
campaign which overwhelmed-and buried-NCSA Mosaic. The "car-
pet-bombing" of America with AOL software-some 250 million free
copies were distributed by AOL through 1996 42-was another classic
campaign to surge past rivals and create critical mass. AOL rose, some-
what incredibly, from just five million subscribers in 1994 to over seven-
teen million in 1999, to dominate, by a large margin, the country's
Internet Service Provider (ISP) sector.43
Predatory intent is not simply animus towards rivals. Every truly
competitive company aims to displace its competitors and to leverage its
assets: 44
In fact, start-ups frequently boast of exploiting techno-
logical niches, obtaining an 'unfair advantage' over their
40 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 273-75 (1999).
41 The strategic nature of such all-or-nothing competition is commonplace in Silicon
Valley. See LARRY DOWNES & CHUNKA MUI, UNLEASHING THE KILLER APP:
DIGITAL STRATEGIES FOR MARKET DOMINANCE (1998); GARY KAWASAKI, HOW
TO DRIVE YOUR COMPETITION CRAZY: CREATING DISRUPTION FOR FUN AND
PROFIT (1995).
42 See SWISHER, supra note 35, at 99.
Thus began what has become one of the riskiest and most innovative branding cam-
paigns in the digital age - the carpet-bombing of America with free AOL disks. The
marketing plan ultimately sent out more than 250 million disks bearing AOL
software to the mass market and was the principal tool in making AOL one of the
best known names in cyberspace.
Id. at 99.
43 The number two ISP is MSN, with about 2 million subscribers.
44 Having achieved a very large base of subscribers, AOL's top management tried to
figure out how to generate additional revenues. They decided to begin charging content prov-
iders for the privilege of reaching their network of online users, thus using their dominance in
supplying online access to extract payments for advertising and e-commerce.
Instead, why not help those who were already in those businesses and, in the process, get
them to pay AOL for that aid? After years of building the AOL brand and attracting millions
of customers, it was time to leverage the asset - or "harvest" it. (The term soon became
widespread at AOL.)
SWISHER, supra note 35, at 277 (emphasis added).
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competitors, and profiting from 'barriers to entry.'
These terms are all considered positive even by those
who champion innovation. 'Everyone leverages their as-
sets,' explains Ken Wasch, the president of the Software
Publishers Association, which has been critical of
Microsoft.45
Conversely, firms known for their cordiality to competitors, or those re-
luctant to seize advantages by leveraging assets, are scarcely champions
for consumers.
The DOJ's interpretation of the phrase "competition on the merits"
highlights the misuse of internal corporate communications in adducing
predatory intent.46 The complaint is breathless in repeatedly unveiling
what DOJ lawyers evidently believe to be a smoking gun:
[A]s Microsoft's Christian Wildfeuer wrote in February
1997, Microsoft concluded that it would "be very hard to
increase browser share on the merits of IE 4 alone. It
will be more important to leverage the OS asset to make
people use IE instead of Navigator. (MS 004346).
Thus, Microsoft began, and continues today ... to de-
prive customers of a choice between alternative brows-
ers, and to exclude Microsoft's Internet browser
competitors.47
The DOJ asserted: "Microsoft's conduct with respect to Internet
browsers ... will be ... to preclude competition on the merits .... ,,48
The complaint cites Microsoft's Senior Vice President James
Allchin's comments from January 2, 1997:
You see browser share as job 1 .... I do not feel we are
going to win on our current path. We are not leveraging
Windows from a marketing perspective .... We do not
use our strength-which is that we have an installed
base of Windows and we have a strong OEM shipment
channel for Windows. Pitting browser against browser is
hard since Netscape has 80% marketshare [sic] and we
have [less than] 20% .... I am convinced we have to use
45 Scott Herhold, Microsoft Antitrust Case Splits Silicon Valley, SAN JosE MERCURY
NEws, Oct. 11, 1998.
46 See Complaint, 12, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No. 98-
1232).
47 1& at para. 12.
48 Id. at para. 38.
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Windows this is the one thing they don't have .... (MS7
005526).49
Allchin's remarks prompted this characterization by the DOJ:
"Microsoft executives have repeatedly recognized the significant advan-
tage that Microsoft (and only Microsoft) receives by tying its Internet
browser to its operating system, rather than having to compete on the
merits." 50
Here the DOJ disconnect is particularly apparent, for the Microsoft
executive has explicitly noted what other email messages-inherently
cryptic, by their very nature incomplete communications- exclude: the
embedded base problem making "competition on the merits" problematic
even for a product equal or superior to the market leader. The problem
is, where customers face non-trivial switching costs (e.g., learning a new
software package), it is difficult to challenge an established product.
This is precisely why Netscape feared it had to strike quickly, "before
people got too comfortable with the NCSA model."'' a Surely Microsoft
faced a more formidable task in taking on the wildly popular Netscape
browser.
Just as the DOJ alleges Microsoft enjoyed "lock-in" among its users
who had invested heavily in learning Windows-compatible programs,
Microsoft-now the entrant into a software market-faced the much
vaunted barrier to entry in reverse. How could Microsoft surmount natu-
ral reluctance to adopt a new technology? Many Netscape users would
be unlikely to switch to even a somewhat better software package simply
because they had learned to use, and like, Netscape. 52 Under such cir-
cumstances, "competition on the merits" would be problematic because
of the positive network effects (barriers to entry in the DOJ lexicon) en-
joyed by the market leader. Seen in this context, Microsoft's strategy to
bundle its browser with Windows is easily explained as a way to over-
come the disadvantages of Netscape's embedded base: Purchasers of
new computers could access Internet Explorer easily and try it out, low-
ering switching costs, pumping demand. Microsoft's concurrent tac-
tics-spending aggressively to upgrade the quality of Internet Explorer,
49 Id. at para. 23 (emphasis in complaint).
50 Id.
51 QUrTTNER & SLATALLA, supra note 38, at 109.
52 I am one such user. Although I understand that recent head-to-head third-party ratings
overwhelmingly favor Internet Explorer over Netscape Navigator, I continue to use Navigator
4.5 on both my office and home PCs. I have used Internet Explorer 4.0, but find myself more
comfortable - and less bothered by pop-up ads - on Navigator. This brand loyalty is not
unusual, in my personal experience, among academics who got accustomed to Netscape's
browser early-on through liberal (zero-priced) site licenses aggressively distributed to
universities.
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and pricing it at zero-reinforced this effort. All three Microsoft policies
increased the value of their product for users.
The DOJ complaint implies Microsoft executives, forlorn about
"competition on the merits," believed they needed an anti-competitive
tool to keep customers from gaining access to their rival's browser. The
primary tactic that the Government singled out for condemnation was
Microsoft's inclusion of Internet Explorer in Windows 95, preventing
computer makers (by threatening to withdraw the Windows license) from
removing either the Internet Explorer software or start-up screen icon.5 3
Rather than removing software or taking away consumer options,
Microsoft was actually forcing OEMs to include extra software-addi-
tional Windows functionality-on computers. The allegation of anti-
competitive behavior made by the DOJ rests on the disincentive this ex-
tra browsing software had on computer makers. As long as Internet Ex-
plorer came pre-loaded, why bother with Netscape?
One reason for PC manufacturers to include Netscape's browser
would be consumer demand, while one reason to exclude it would be that
it cost too much. These are precisely the rational trade-offs firms are
supposed to make in an efficient world. Prior to being forced by
Microsoft's competition to lower its price to zero in January 1998, Net-
scape was charging forty-nine dollars per copy in selected markets where
it could impose fees. 54 Netscape's January 1998 policy shift re-instated
its original policy of free online distribution, which had created a tidal
wave of support for the new product. Prices were imposed only as the
firm wagered that its market power was sufficient to warrant such. It
was a risky strategy that backfired. It allowed Microsoft Internet Ex-
plorer enormous marketing advantages during 1996-97. Netscape, even
with a quality product, considerable "first-mover" advantages, excellent
brand name capital, and the "lock-in" of a huge embedded base, hemor-
rhaged market share. It soon became apparent that the "freebie model"
was the optimal policy, not just for introducing Netscape and seizing
momentum to overwhelm NSCA Mosaic, but to capture the lucrative
returns to scale associated with web site development. As usage of Net-
scape browsing software largely drives traffic to Netscape's "Netcenter"
web site, the company's sacrifice of browser market share in favor of
retail software revenue soon proved unprofitable.55
53 Microsoft also imposed other restrictions, including the rule that while other software
could be pre-loaded-including Netscape Navigator-no icons could be more prominently
displayed on the start-up screen than the standard-issue icons placed there by Microsoft.
54 QUIITNER & SLATALLA, supra note 38, at 109.
55 In their recent book on the economics of the Net, Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian
write: "In some cases, especially for software with zero marginal cost, you can go beyond free
samples and actually -pay people to take your product As we see it, there is nothing special
about zero as a price, as long as you have multiple revenue streams to recover costs." SHA-
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Despite the DOJ's overarching reliance on internal memos, the evi-
dence presented merely uncovers a Microsoft plot to aggressively move
product. The DOJ complaint details this explicitly, but seems to miss its
significance: "[A] presentation to Microsoft CEO Bill Gates on January
5, 1997, on how to respond to the Java threat emphasized 'Increase IE
share' as a key strategy." 56
Importantly, nothing in the DOJ's evidence file links the alleged
predator's attack on Netscape to an anti-consumer result. Such memos
do materialize in antitrust cases from time to time. One instance in-
volved the case of Leza Coleman v. Sacramento Cable Television,57 a
1994 California class action brought against a monopoly cable firm
which had used a discriminatory pricing scheme to help destroy two
fledgling entrants, thus restoring and maintaining monopoly pricing.58 In
that case, the CEO of the incumbent firm alerted company executives to
the possibility that competition from the second such entrant, Pacific
West, would result in lower prices over the long run.5 9
The key memo, "dated January 25, 1988 ... bemoaned the problem
of 'revenue exposure' (price cuts due to competition) and estimated the
dollar loss if the second competitor got a foothold in the market:
$16,550,000 over 30 months. The memo concluded: 'Taking Pac West
out of the picture early has significant value."' 60 The firm proceeded to
selectively slash prices, giving away free cable to some, free color televi-
sions to others-but only on those streets where the competitive entrant
offered cable service.61 Both competitors were soon discouraged from
continuing to invest in fixed plant to serve additional homes, and the
incumbent promptly raised prices back to monopoly levels (those pre-
vailing elsewhere) upon its rivals' exit from the market.62
PIRO & VARIAN, supra note 40, at 274. They go on to specifically relate this tactical ap-
proach to the browser war:.
Start with Netscape. The key is that placements of Navigator help Netscape earn
revenues from its other products. For example, Netscape's Web site is one of the
most heavily accessed pieces of real estate on the Net, in large part because many of
the 65 million users of Navigator have never changed the default setting on their
browsers.
IL at 293.
56 Complaint at para. 8, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No,
98-1232).
57 California Superior Court, County of Sacramento; No 524077 [final judgment ren-
dered in June 1994]. The author testified as an expert witness in the case, retained by the
plaintiffs.
58 Id.
59 Thomas W. Hazlett and George Bittlingmayer, Befuddled by "Internet Time:" The
Government's Pointless Lawsuit Against Microsoft, THE WKLy. STANDARD, July 5-12, 1999,
23, 24.
60 lad at 23-24.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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This behavior, and other evidence in Leza Coleman, serve as a
model for "smoking gun" intent. The basic facts of the case fit neatly
into the four-part test for predation. 63 The defendant firm clearly en-
joyed monopoly profits and benefited from long-run barriers to entry,
including municipal franchise barriers (opportunity). 64 When challenged
by upstart competitors, it devised a strategy to temporarily cut prices, a
policy explicitly linked to a plan to enable high prices post-competition
(intent).65 It undertook actions having no efficiency justification, in-
cluding the pricing of particular units below marginal cost (conduct).66
Finally, it punished consumers with price increases once rivals were van-
quished, while maintaining high prices wherever it had deterred competi-
tion (effect).67 Notably, actual competitors were present, not predicted
(as in the case of Netscape/Java developing into a quasi operating sys-
tem), and temporary price cuts to benefit customers were actually re-
voked.68 The DOJ presented one of these indicia of predation as
evidence in the Microsoft case.
There is, however, a curious tie between Leza Coleman and United
States v. Microsoft, Corp.; the economic expert testifying on behalf of
Sacramento Cable Television ("SCT"') was MIT Professor Franklin
Fisher-the same expert the Government retained to testify against
Microsoft.69 Fisher's testimony in Leza Coleman exonerated the defend-
ant of any anti-competitive intent or effect, despite crushing competitors
and raising prices: "As regards the behavior of SCT... it seems to me
that their behavior was, in fact, competitive behavior and ought not to be
characterized as anti-competitive .... Companies should not be com-
pelled to hold a price umbrella over inefficient competitors. They're also
not compelled to be stupid and not notice when the inefficient competitor
goes out of business."'70 Professor Fisher went on to explain so long as
prices exceeded incremental costs a firm's actions were legal and threats
to rivals were of no moment. "A company takes an action[,]" testified
Fisher. "It is profit maximizing on its own bottom. It may also have the
effect of destroying or eliminating competition. In that case, you found
63 See the discussion of Leza Coleman in Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable
TV Markets, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 610-25 (1995).
64 Id. at 614, 626-30. On market power in the cable television industry, see THOMAS
W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVI-
SION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS (1997).
65 See Hazlett, supra note 63, at 630-31
66 Id. at 609-13.
67 Id. at 623-25.
68 Id.
69 HAZLETT & BITLINGMAYER, supra note 59.
70 Id. at 24.
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documents in which the company says, 'Yes, we are going to destroy or
eliminate competition.' That strikes me as irrelevant. '71
C. CONDUCT
Much of the analysis used by courts and legal theorists in predatory
pricing cases focuses on the "pricing-below-cost" test. Specifically,
where firms possess the ability to recoup short-term losses (i.e., opportu-
nity to predate), pricing units below marginal cost 72 is often character-
ized as presumptively anti-competitive. The logic stems from the
assumption of rational profit-maximizing behavior on the part of the
firm. Because units sold at prices below marginal cost would save the
company money if simply not produced at all, the action begs for an
explanation. The strategy of temporarily flooding the market with low-
priced product so as to force out a rival and raise prices post-exit is seen
to fill the void.
In its complaint, the Government alleges the "free give-away" of
Internet Explorer was anti-competitive. 73 In addition, the complaint ar-
gues Microsoft illegally foreclosed Netscape from various channels of
product distribution by signing exclusive contracts with Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content Providers (ICPs).74 The two ISPs
cited by the DOJ as entering into exclusive distribution of Microsoft's
Internet Explorer were AOL and CompuServe, a subsidiary of AOL.75 It
is exceptionally problematic for the DOJ that AOL purchased Netscape
in March 1999;76 according to the Government's complaint it is now
foreclosing itself by continuing to use Microsoft's Internet Explorer as
the default browser software distributed to its seventeen million subscrib-
ers. Perhaps almost as damaging to the government's case is the fact that
the complaint also singled-out three ICPs for entering anti-competitive
agreements with Microsoft: CBS Sportsline, Hollywood Online, and Dis-
ney.7 7 Just one year after the complaint was filed, internet web traffic
71 Id. In a case of bizarre lawyering, Microsoft counsel only attempted to introduce the
previous writings and testimony of Franklin Fisher after he had left the witness stand where he
had testified for nine days in both the case-in-chief and rebuttal phases. Microsoft attorneys
withdrew their request after David Boies, representing the United States, handed them a copy
of the relevant section of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
72 "Average variable cost" or "incremental cost" typically serve as proxies for marginal
cost, since marginal costs are virtually impossible to calculate. See Areeda & Turner, supra
note 17.
73 Complaint at para. 16-17, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998)
(No. 98-1232).
74 See id. at para. 27-33.
75 See id. at para. 31.
76 See id. at para. 34.
77 Complaint at para. 89, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No.
98-1232).
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rankings (see Table 1) establish that such exclusive agreements are not
likely to have any material impact on the ability of consumers to access
rival browser software.
TABLE 1: MOST POPULAR WEB SITES (MAY 1999)
Percent of total users visiting sites
AOL 40.2%
Yahoo! 30.0%
MSN 24.6%
Lycos 18.0%
Go 13.6%
Excite
GeoCities
Microsoft
AltaVista
Blue Mountain Arts
Amazon
EBay
AT&T
Snap
Time Warner
While Microsoft's Microsoft Network ("MSN") was the third most
popular web site, of the three partners suspected of advancing
Microsoft's Internet Explorer monopoly strategy via exclusive cross-
links, only Disney's GO site was among the 15 most popular Net content
providers as of May 1999. In fact, the most popular web portals be-
longed to AOL, the arch-rival of Microsoft as owner of Netscape and
competitor to MSN, and Yahoo!, an Internet start-up which strictly ad-
heres to an open access policy with software providers and service prov-
iders, publicizing its avoidance of exclusive relationships.
78
78 Their annual report states:
Since the formation of Yahoo!, we have been relentless in building Yahoo! into the
only place anyone in the world would have to go to find and get connected to any-
thing or anybody.. .Yahoo! is a leader in delivering the widest choice of content and
services available to Internet users.
We have always been very focused on acquiring and retaining as large and as broad
a global audience as possible. By strategic choice, we have remained independent
with regard to the content or merchant services we aggregate on behalf of our world-
wide users. Users highly value choice, and our unique position is that of the in-
dependent, open aggregator of anything and everything users could want to find and
get connected to.
YAHOO!, INC., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1999).
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The allegation that Microsoft engaged in predatory conduct by seek-
ing to foreclose Netscape's browser is dubious, since Microsoft clearly
has an efficiency defense. By establishing large market share for its
product Microsoft is creating the network effects prompting consumers
to place additional value on the product, inducing users to invest in learn-
ing the skills associated with product use. Exclusive agreements be-
tween various firms in the vertical chain of production and distribution
are often observed, and have a variety of efficiency implications, just as
does vertical integration-itself a form of exclusive dealing and foreclo-
sure.79 Importantly, the exclusive agreements sought and gained by
Microsoft-were they intended to vanquish Netscape- missed their
mark. AOL and CompuServe are now connected to Netscape by com-
mon ownership, and-even counting either of the above as Microsoft
Internet Explorer loyalists-Netscape is roughly even with Microsoft in
terms of browser market share. Indeed, counting by usage, Netscape
reportedly maintained a sizeable lead over Microsoft right through the
'jihad": "Recent data indicate that Netscape Navigator's share of usage
is 54 percent, with Microsoft's Internet Explorer weighing in at 33 per-
cent. (Cyberdog, for the Macintosh, is a distant third with around 5 per-
cent of hits.)" 80
The allegation that Microsoft foreclosed competition through exclu-
sive agreements with ISPs and ICPs is, in light of market developments,
implausible. Indeed, at trial the government was forced to argue that the
AOL/Netscape merger had no effect on the issues of the case, thus logi-
cally eliminating the problem of an exclusive contract between AOL and
Microsoft as part of a campaign to destroy Netscape.81 (If an exclusive
alliance between AOL and Microsoft creates foreclosure, then formation
of the reverse alliance-AOL buying Netscape-undoes it.) The other
contractual "foreclosure" allegations, never impressive in light of the
small market shares involved, quickly faded. The Government was
forced back to the traditional predation analysis, attempting to show that
Microsoft's conduct was presumptively anti-competitive because the
company purposely lost money while aggressively promoting its "non-
revenue" web browser.82
There are two gaping holes in the Government's argument. First, it
is clear the marginal costs of software are very close to zero; 83 hence,
79 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMiCA 386 (1937). For a further
discussion of vertical restrictions, see Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Eco-
nomic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1977).
80 SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 40, at 290.
81 United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No. 98-1232).
82 Franklin Fisher, the DOJ economist, repeatedly referred to IE as a "non-revenue" item.
83 The DOJ's economic expert in the 1995 consent decree litigation, Nobel Laureate Ken
Arrow, stated: 'The software market is peculiarly characterized by increasing returns to
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giving away Microsoft Internet Explorer as a free add-on to Windows is
"profitable on its own bottom" and economically efficient. Second, there
is a very compelling pro-consumer rationale for pricing below unit cost
(even paying people to adopt) in brouwserware. By popularizing a
branded standard, building demand for additional software (e.g., operat-
ing systems and applications) and e-commerce (where Microsoft partici-
pates in a wide range of revenue-producing activities), and enhancing
web site traffic to Microsoft.com, the distributor of Internet Explorer
gains with each person who adopts it.
Market valuations suggest that popular web sites are worth about
$200 to $1000 per monthly user.84 As Internet Explorer accesses the
Internet through Microsoft's own web portal (which can be changed by
the user, but-as noted above-is typically left in the default setting),
Internet Explorer has turned out to be a very good investment "on its
own bottom." That is because, even accounting for the fixed costs of
writing the code and creating the first copy of Internet Explorer, total
Microsoft expenditures on IE have been on the order of $500 million.
Yet, as of mid 1999, Microsoft.com was valued (separate from the com-
pany) at about $8 billion. If even a small fraction of web site traffic is
linked to the site, as is extremely conservative to assume, then
Microsoft's "free give-away" in the browser war is already an excellent
investment without the assistance of future price increases for customers.
With "penetration pricing," software firms efficiently achieve criti-
cal mass, establish new products, and create virtual networks.85 Frances
Caimcross dubs this "the freebie model," and the "give-away model,"
ironically singling out Netscape's marketing strategy as a classic
example:
The freebie model was repeated by Netscape. It grabbed
the early lead in the browser market using two ploys.
First, Netscape's software was distributed on-line, rather
than through retail stores, thus saving the costs of pack-
aging and distribution. Second, by giving its basic prod-
uct away free, the company kick-started the market. In
six months, six million copies of the Netscape Navigator
were downloaded, producing enough publicity for Net-
scape to start charging - and to distribute fifty million
scale... Virtually all the costs of production are in the design of the software and therefore
independent of the amount sold, so that marginal costs are virtually zero." Declaration of
Kenneth J. Arrow in U.S. v. Microsoft - (January 17, 1995).
84 For instance, in Spring 1999, Yahoo! has about 30 million users per month, and the
company (which is a web site), is worth about $30 billion.
85 Shapiro and Varian specifically apply this concept to the NetscapelMicrosoft browser
war. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 40, at 292-4.
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browsers in a mere two years. That boosted the market
for Netscape's expensive "server" software, which com-
panies use on their host computers to communicate with
browsers.
The give-away model makes eminent sense when it
costs nothing extra to.make more copies of a product.
Computer games and browser software cost money to
develop but not to manufacture. Distribute them on-line,
and the publicity also comes free. And, of course, pub-
licity for the product also attracts more users to the
Internet.86
To argue that Microsoft's market position renders an otherwise le-
gitimate strategy off-limits is not persuasive. The conduct has the same
business rationale for Netscape or Microsoft. That rationale is efficient
behavior that ultimately benefits consumers. To constrain Microsoft
from responding to competition due to its market position would clearly
carry anti-consumer consequences. Should Microsoft be allowed to just
match the forty-nine dollar market price for browsers prevailing at the
time of Internet Explorer 3.0, going no lower? Should Microsoft be pro-
hibited from enhancing the functionality of its software, capping its per-
formance at the level of an equally-priced competitor? Public policies
tempering the aggressiveness of competitive firms can clearly injure the
competitive process, "protecting" consumers with high prices and slug-
gish performance.
D. EFFEcT
Any court adjudicating a charge of predation should be keenly inter-
ested in evidence related to the effects the allegedly illegal behavior has
on the consuming public. As consumer welfare maximization is the ap-
propriate aim of antitrust law,87 a pattern of anti-competitive behavior
that fails to harm customers is an empty vessel.
The facts of the "browser war" lead inexorably to one conclusion:
consumers have benefited enormously from the ferocious rivalry be-
tween Netscape and Microsoft. From the very dawn of the "browser
market" itself, competition between the combatants has driven innova-
tion, suppressed prices, extended applications, and hurried technical ad-
vances to markets now said to operate on "Internet Time."
Before Netscape had even developed its Navigator browser, Net-
scape's creators operated on the threat posed by Microsoft. It motivated
them to innovate well. The tiny start-up was absolutely certain that the
86 FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH oF DisT CE 102 (1997).
87 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 81-89 (1978).
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dominant player in personal computing software would respond, and re-
spond powerfully. To pre-empt Microsoft, Netscape sought to create
more than "just" a browser sufficiently useful to beat NCSA Mosaic. It
went further, strategically creating an entire platform for non-Microsoft
applications. That was the role of Java:
It was a given that Netscape needed to maintain its fran-
tic pace of development to compete with Microsoft. But
[Netscape Vice President Marc] Andreessen knew that
maintaining the pace would not be enough to win the
war, not if Microsoft ramped up and assigned hundreds
of engineers to write its own version of a browser. To
beat Microsoft under those circumstances, Netscape
would have to increase the pace and go even faster, re-
leasing subsequent versions of Navigator as quickly as
possible.
Faster? Such a goal was almost impossible in the
world of 1995, a world in which software programs like
browsers grew bigger and clumsier with each successive
release
Java could transform that world, because the lan-
guage was platform independent... It could save a sig-
nificant amount of development time .... 88
Netscape was the first Java licensee, and it ostentatiously set about
its innovative foray by forging an alliance with the "ABM crowd"8 9 (led
by Sun Microsystems, developer of Java).90 Its strategy was to bring a
universe of software products onto the PC, to be read not by Windows
but by Java. This "cross-platform" capability allowed Netscape to access
a multitude of applications and to write new Navigator versions faster,
saving the duplicated effort involved in multiple software language inter-
faces. Hence, the essential development supporting the DOJ's entire the-
ory of predation against a potential competitor-that rivalry to Windows
was made possible on the PC by the universal software applications com-
patibility embedded in Netscape via Java-was a creation of the "jihad."
As Netscape sought to preempt Microsoft, Microsoft reacted to Net-
scape.91 The software giant raced to build a better browser, spending
hundreds of millions of dollars in the process, 92 and soon achieved qual-
ity success. While the 1995 version of Internet Explorer, 1.0, had re-
88 QUHITNER & SLATALLA, supra note 38, at 225-26 (emphasis in orginal).
89 See CUSUMANO & YOFFIE, supra note 23, at 133.
90 See id
91 See QUITNER & SLATALLA, supra note 38, at 263-97.
92 Microsoft assembled 800 employees to work specifically on Internet Explorer. See id.
at 266.
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ceived poor reviews and was clearly inferior to Netscape's browser,
Internet Explorer 3.0 received generally positive reviews from software
magazines when it was released in August 1996.93 Internet Explorer pul-
led even in ranking "wins" against Netscape Navigator in the second half
of 1996, and then won decisively in 1997 and 1998.94 Of course, the
ever-improving functionality of either browser delivered substantial ben-
efits to millions of consumers, who responded by flocking online in
droves.
As Microsoft's browser product improved to be fully competitive
with Netscape's software, the company embarked on a campaign to dis-
tribute millions of copies of Internet Explorer through bulk agreements
with ISPs.95 Of course, the DOJ complaint characterizes these agree-
ments as anti-competitive deals pursued by Microsoft to cut off Net-
scape's "air supply. '96 But pitting the rival browsers in head-to-head
competitions before major ISPs achieved substantial transaction econo-
mies. Because companies such as AOL, Netcom and AT&T (owner of
AT&T WorldNet) sell online access to customers, they have a vested
interest in the availability of low-priced, high-quality complementary
products. Web surfing software is highly complementary to ISP output,
so much so that the standard online start-up kit includes a browser seam-
lessly embedded within it. Hence, the ISPs act as de facto consumer
agents, selecting browsing software optimized for customer needs.
Moreover, due to economies of scale, ISPs naturally bring considerable
expertise to the selection process.
At trial, the DOJ introduced testimony from Steve Case, CEO of
America Online, purporting to establish Microsoft used its Windows mo-
nopoly (and control over new computer start-up screens) to muscle AOL
into its March 1996 exclusive agreement to use Internet Explorer
software as the default browser provided to its subscribers. 97 But the
story has been told elsewhere, by less interested parties. 98 This reporting
reveals a sharply contrasting tale, one which vividly demonstrates how
the aggressive Microsoft marketing efforts led directly to lower prices
and better products for millions of consumers. Hence, I quote at some
length:
93 See iL at 273.
94 See STANLEY J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS
AND MICROSOFr 219 (1999).
95 See Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998)
96 Id. at para. 16, (quoting Paul Maritz, Microsoft's Group Vice President in charge of
the Platforms Group).
97 AOL Chief Bolstered Key Allegation In Microsoft Case, Reuters ( Sept. 17, 1998).
" he head of America Online, Inc., Wednesday bolstered a key allegation in the government's
antitrust case against Microsoft Corp., saying his company opted for the software giant's In-
ternet browser to get a better position in the Windows operating system."
98 See SWISHER supra note 35, among others.
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Case decided to conduct a "bake-off" between Net-
scape's Navigator and Microsoft's Explorer. David
Cole, AOL's Internet head, let an effort in which the en-
tire executive team looked at the two deals from a vari-
ety 'of perspectives-price, technology issues, and
simple company rapport.
From the start, Case and most of the AOL execu-
tives were still predisposed to Netscape-and, more to
the point, against Microsoft. When [Microsoft's] Brad
Chase first visited AOL's Virginia offices to talk about
Explorer, his chances were broadcast quickly to him.
"I went up to the receptionist and signed in and she
looked at me and said, 'Microsoft, oooooh,"' he
recalled.
Luckily for Chase, neither Cole nor David Col-
burnm-one of AOL's top deal-making executives . . .
was leaning toward anyone. Given to wearing cowboy
boots and a few days' stubble, Colburn styled himself as
a kind of maverick at AOL.
"I basically looked at what was the better deal for
AOL, what would give us the most advantages," he said.
"I didn't care about what the hell Silicon Valley thought,
or that Microsoft was the anti-Christ, or that Netscape
was so cool. I only thought, Who's got what we need?"
He quickly found that Netscape did not have what
AOL needed, and Microsoft did. On almost every issue,
he said, "It seemed like Netscape was taking things off
the table, while Microsoft kept putting them on."
There was price: Netscape insisted that AOL pay
millions of dollars for the browser-on a per-user basis,
like all of its customers-because it was not in the busi-
ness of giving its software away to big corporate users.
Microsoft-looking to extend browser market share
quickly-was offering it to AOL for free ....
There was technology: Netscape did not want to
change Navigator in any substantial way to accommo-
date AOL, and wanted Navigator to sit on top of AOL,
directing users to the Netscape site as they entered the
Web. But AOL wanted ... a customized browser that
was seamlessly integrated into the service .... On the
other hand, Microsoft was willing to change the browser
in any way that was amenable to its service design, mak-
ing it easier to customize.
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And there was rapport: "Netscape thought we had
nowhere else to go," said Colburn. "It was like, 'AOL
has to do a deal with us, because (1) we're the leading
browser, and (2) Microsoft is its archenemy.' "
Microsoft, again, seemed to bend over backward to get
the AOL business. There was even a full-scale press of
Case by Gates himself. "I went after the AOL business,"
said Gates in a later interview.99
Another recent book adds some interesting detail on what followed
the "bake-off':' °
Netscape later rebuffed opportunities to reengage AOL.
As much as half of Microsoft's early market share gains
in browsers came from its deal with AOL. Nonetheless,
[Netscape executive] Ram Shriram told us that four
months after AOL signed its deal with Microsoft, Net-
scape could have recovered half the market share it was
about to lose:
AOL came to us again. AOL's stock was tanking,
and it was getting sued by the attorney generals [sic] of
various states... They were keen to come back to the
table and forge a partnership with us... Only two people
went on this trip to go see Steve Case-me and Barks-
dale. Jim and I went there trying to figure out how to
make a new AOL user interface with the Netscape
browser. (Despite the Microsoft contract), they had
some deal that stated, if the desktop got diluted with lots
of icons, they were not required to keep Microsoft as the
only default... We both came back from that trip and
pitched it to Andreessen, the engineering team, and Ho-
mer. But we got a very tepid response back at the
ranch... Netscape was saying, "We're really not inter-
ested. Our focus is not on consumers, so we're not terri-
bly interested in working with you." We lost another
opportunity to take charge of another 10 to 12 million
browsers.'01
Netscape was soon forced to respond to Microsoft. It reduced its
price for Navigator from forty-nine dollars to zero in January 1998, and
took the bold step of actually publishing its source code on the web.
This risky move, revealing company secrets, was taken to allow Naviga-
99 SWISHER supra note 35, at 136-37.
100 See CUSUMANO & YOFFIE, supra note 23.
101 Id. at 115-18.
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tor users the opportunity to customize solutions, creating value for indi-
viduals and the network (which expands as a result). It also assured
users high prices would not be imposed in the future (the product itself
was already on the Net, ready to substitute for any high-priced Netscape
package in the future). The measure was aimed directly at Microsoft,
which guards its source code as a proprietary capital asset. In addition,
Netscape continued to add functionality to its browser, including inte-
grated email software and a suite of communications services. 10 2
The browser war continues. Netscape, now safely absorbed into an
AOL empire capitalized at about $100 billion as of September 1999, is
alive and well. 103 Its market share is reduced, but it continues to be
highly competitive, and perhaps more popular in terms of usage, than
Microsoft. Moreover, absolute usage has continued to climb for both
browsers throughout the competition; a diminished share of a rapidly ex-
panding online marketplace has led to substantial increases in output.1°4
Meanwhile, the frenzy on Wall Street is over software start-ups, e-com-
merce firms, Internet infrastructure providers, Net telephony suppliers-
the entire panoply of firms thriving on the expansion of online serv-
ices.' 05 At the center of this tectonic plate shift in capital formation
stands the consumer interface bringing millions of individuals and busi-
nesses to the Net: browser software. Indeed, the Internet IPO craze was
itself ignited by the most successful initial public offering in history as of
August 8, 1995: the IPO of Netscape Communications, which managed
to become capitalized at $4.4 billion in just one day. 10 6 (MIicrosoft, after
its IPO in 1986, was worth a mere $519 million.) 10 7 One wonders how
when an intense struggle between two firms has been so visibly con-
nected to dynamic economic changes producing vast new efficiencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Microsoft is going to try to be technical and precise and the gov-
ernment's going to paint in broad brushes-and they'll pass each other
in the night as they usually do."'108
After the case of United States v. Microsoft concluded, the parties
framed the case for Judge Jackson in two disparate summations. 10 9 As
102 See l
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See QUITTNER & SLATALLA, supra note 38, at 248.
107 Id. at 248.
108 Joe Wilcox, Final Arguments in Microsoft Antitrust Trial, CNET News.com, (Sept.
21, 1999) <http://www.news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-202-121650.html> (quoting Joe Sims, an
antitrust lawyer with Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue).
109 Id.
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one antitrust expert noted, rather than meet the government's allegations
head-on, Microsoft attempted to bob and weave, challenging the evi-
dence and raising issues of doubt.110 Instead, they might have chosen to
directly confront the government's case by telling Microsoft's story, the
story of how-motivated by the fear and greed they are rightfully ac-
cused of-they took extraordinary measures to confront a competitor and
win the browser war.
They might have elected to agree, arguendo, with the government's
allegation it initially met with Netscape executives and threatened to
squash the upstart company like a bug."' This was the prized exhibit
showcased in the government's summation.
Mr. Boies then recounted what he called a pattern of actions
Microsoft took to protect its Windows dominance and extend it to the
Internet, beginning with a now-famous June 21, 1995, meeting in which
Microsoft is alleged to have illegally offered to carve up the Internet-
browser market with Netscape. The meeting, and the events that fol-
lowed, he said, "provide insight into Microsoft's soul." 112
Imagine instead of quibbling about the Netscape witnesses' rendi-
tion of this meeting, which Microsoft witnesses vehemently contest,
Microsoft assumed them to be true-and told the rest of the story with a
"broad brush." For all of Microsoft's ferocious audacity and anti-com-
petitive intent, Netscape's fledgling entrepreneurs, after being threatened
by the world's mightiest software giant, felt sufficiently potent to reject
the offer and leave the room under their own power. Just three months
later, in fact, their daring move was warmly embraced by the kindest
affection American capitalism has to offer, as they launched the most
successful IPO in U.S. financial history (opportunistically using the ubiq-
uitous publicity from a $200 million Microsoft Windows 95 promotional
budget as a booster rocket). 113 Having amassed vast personal wealth,
these executives struggled for the next three years to compete with the
Microsoft juggernaut, which foreclosed distribution channels and gave
away free rival software, and upgraded its product to the point where it
was winning all the independent ratings. 114 Seeing its market share drop
from eighty percent to perhaps as low as forty-five percent, the company
110 Id.
111 Netscape CEO James Barksdale testified: "I have never been in a meeting in my
thirty-three-year business career in which a competitor had so blatantly implied that we should
either stop competing with it or the competitor would kill us." ANDREWS, supra note 24, at
290.
112 John R. Wilke & Sarah Lueck, As Trial Closes, U.S. Says Microsoft Stifled Innovative
Rivals, WAuL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1999, at A4.
113 For an excellent account of the Netscape IPO, see QUITINER & SLATALLA, supra
note 38, at 238-51.
114 See id.; ANDREWS, supra note 24.
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finally elected to sell its equity shares to America Online for a mere $10
billion.115
In the interim, due to the bloody nature of the browser "jihad," cus-
tomers saw prices slashed and functionality mushroom. Concurrently,
complementary sectors-including computers, microprocessors, e-com-
merce, online services, communications infrastructure, and networking-
experienced an investment boom of historic proportions premised largely
on the massive expansion in PC web browsing. Entry into software and
software-related markets became a mad dash, with venture capital funds
swelling and "dot.com" start-ups flooding the financial markets-turning
the DOJ's May 1998 prediction Microsoft's browser war would discour-
age investment and freeze new entry on its head.
What the government has advanced as compelling evidence of pre-
dation turns out to be a case of mistaken identity. The DOJ has confused
the fundamentally raucous nature of pro-consumer competition in a dy-
namic market featuring important network effects with an antitrust viola-
tion. This is why it is so curious that Microsoft avoided the "broad
brush" in favor of scoring "technical points" at trial. The big picture was
surely Microsoft's best defense. In a systematic search for signs of pre-
dation by scanning opportunity, intent, conduct and effect, the case filed
against Microsoft in May 1998 is seen to be unconvincing in every one
of the four test areas jointly necessary to establish anti-competitive
action.
Software experts surmise Microsoft products have a standard life
cycle. The first version issued is typically quite a mess, hurried to mar-
ket, full of bugs. It's really just a start. The second edition has often
eliminated many of the bugs, and works-but is still not considered pol-
ished. Finally, with the 3.0 version, the software has been thoroughly
debugged and has been upgraded to be user-friendly. This is the model
that proceeds to amass market share-just as Internet Explorer 3.0 was
the breakthrough innovation in Microsoft's browser "jihad."
By this standard, investors in the Redmond, Washington computer
firm can look to the future with some optimism. The district court trial
has just concluded, and the bugs in Microsoft's presentation were glar-
ing, crashes frequent. Look for the company's defense to run much
smoother at the D.C. Court of Appeals. By the time oral arguments are
heard at the U.S. Supreme Court, Microsoft's defense will be the "killer
app" for antitrust analysis in the New Economy.
115 Id.
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